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Internet voting has for many years attracted the atten-
tion of the general public, election officials and security re-
searchers. However, only very few remote internet voting
systems have been used in actual elections. Those election
officials that enabled remote electronic voting rarely use vot-
ing protocols proposed by the security and cryptography
community, instead opting for black box systems that need
to be trusted as it is not possible for the public to verify the
election in any terms. On the research side there already ex-
ist very promising end to end verifiable voting schemes (that
incorporate both individual and universal verifiability), like
Helios and Civitas. From a cryptographic perspective the
main challenge is to find an appropriate balance between
verifiability, anonymity and coercion resistance while ide-
ally ensuring all three to a particular extent. The usability
and practicability of these schemes has in the past been ne-
glected. Many protocols are too complex for average voters
to interact with or even understand the underlying concepts.
As a result of this, voters will neither accept such systems
nor opt to verify their votes. This would also mean that the
system then is not much more secure than an easy-to-use
black box system. In our research we focus on making verifi-
able remote e-voting systems user friendly and practical. We
focus on the Helios voting system as it is the only one that
has been implemented including user interfaces. In previous
work [4], we conducted a usability analysis of Helios version
3.0 based on the cognitive walkthrough approach while fo-
cusing on vote casting and the individual verifiability. Based
on the findings we proposed new interfaces. We recently
conducted a lab study on these improved interfaces. In this
abstract we describe the result of the cognitive walkthrough
in terms of the improved interfaces and processes. We also
propose the setup of the lab study and a first overview of
the expected results. Results will be presented in greater
detail during the oral poster presentation.
2. RELATED WORK
A few studies on the usability of e-voting sytems have been
undertaken: Non-remote and non-verifiable e-voting in e.g.
[3]; verifiable e-voting devices used in polling stations where
the verifiability is mostly implemented by a paper audit trail
e.g. in [7], as well as scan based approaches e.g. in [2].
The NIST special publication [5] also defines usability and
accessibility requirements for electronic voting systems. The
usability of Helios version 1.0 has been assessed in [6]. The
authors set up a mock student election with twenty voters
participating. Their findings were that the interfaces were
not user friendly at all.
3. THE HELIOS VOTING SYSTEM
Helios is an open-source, end to end verifiable remote elec-
tronic voting system implemented and presented by Ben
Adida [1]. It is currently available in Version 3.1 1. Running
Helios requires that a voter’s web browser has Javascript en-
abled. Communication is secured by SSL. Voter authentica-
tion is secret-based (received via email). A key feature in its
operation is the separation of ballot preparation from ballot
casting. This is done in order to provide individual verifia-
bility and secrecy for the voter and allow anyone to challenge
the system regarding the cast as intended aspect of individ-
ual verifiability. As a result the voter only authenticates at
the end of the vote casting process. Due to this fact, ev-
eryone is able to make a candidate selection, encrypt it and
verify that Helios has encrypted their choice correctly. Once
voters are satisfied with the accuracy they are prompted to
authenticate themselves in order to cast the vote. The next
relevant property when analysing usability of the system is
that voters cannot verify the final vote that they choose to
cast due to secrecy concerns.
4. IMPROVED USER INTERFACES
With a team of usability experts and e-voting experts,
we carried out a cognitive walkthrough on the current ver-
sion [4]. The e-voting experts had an understanding of the
details of the underlying voting protocol. Based on our find-
ings we suggested improvements to the Helios interfaces and
processes. In order to give the reader an impression of the
improvements, Fig. 1 shows the individual verifiability pro-
cess in the original version and Fig. 2 in our improved ver-
sion. We made several general usability improvements (such
as back and forward buttons and use of consistent wording)
which are not discussed here. In addition, the following im-
provements were suggested: Voters receive voting informa-
tion and credentials by postal mail instead via email. This
is a more secure way of distributing login credentials and an
approach users may be more familiar with. This letter con-
tains a link to access the vote casting website whereas in the
original email the voter was first directed to a confusing elec-
tion web page where they found instructions. We changed
the instructions on the first page. After having encrypted
the ballot, a verification code is displayed. We shortened this
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Figure 1: Verifiability Process
hash value based on a security analysis of what is required
for a four day Internet voting election. The instructions have
been improved in particular by explaining the purpose for
this verification code. The most dramatic change was to the
verification process. Here, if the voters opt to verify the bal-
lot, a new webpage is displayed containing different trusted
institutions to carry out the verifiability. They will select
one of these institutions to verify their ballot. The results
of the verification will be displayed in a separate window
displaying a web page hosted by the corresponding institute
(Fig. 2). The text on these pages has been improved also
as it was not clear in the original interfaces that ‘proofs ok’
is clear feedback for the voter. In this context the fact that
Figure 2: Verifiability Institutions and Results.
a new verification code is generated and displayed after the
verification is highlighted in the improved version. Finally,
the confirmation and authentication process has been sim-
plified.
5. USER STUDY SETTING
A mock mayoral election was set up and participation was
invited from both technical and non-technical users. Re-
cruitment was by word of mouth invitation in and around a
university campus. We recruited thirty users, fifteen with a
technical background in that they either have studied some
aspect of computing at university level or use computers on a
regular basis, for example for online shopping and e-banking.
No monetary compensation was given to the participants.
They however received a USB memory stick with the insti-
tution’s logo. The lab used was a room set up with a com-
puter for the user to cast their vote and answer a web-based
questionnaire. A modified bicycle helmet with eye tracking
lens was connected to a separate laptop. First, the user an-
swered an initial questionnaire with general questions such
as age, gender and computer knowledge. Next they used
the voting system for the first time, unguided. After the
vote was cast or the process was aborted by the user, they
answered a second questionnaire to give their opinion about
the system. After this the voter was given instructions on
how to interact with the voting system. Finally upon com-
pletion, the users filled out an exit questionnaire. Besides
questions on the general usability of the voting system and
the individual verifiability there are also questions on users’
concerns over the security of the voting website and the vot-
ing system both regarding the secrecy and the integrity of
their vote. Finally we include questions to determine which
wording is appropriate and readily identifiable to the users’
in the context of verifiability in remote e-voting. The eye-
tracking helmet enables us to view the points on the screen
that users paid attention to as well as to check whether users
really compared the verification code written down with the
displayed one. One result so far is that the technical partici-
pants raised complaints about a lack of detailed information
while some of the non-technical ones could not understand
why the system itself was not secure enough and why their
own effort to verify something was required. Here, it should
be mentioned that we did not provide any information about
verifiable electronic voting systems to the participants of the
user study beforehand.
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